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Abstract
This study contends that the low rate of e-marketplace
acceptance by Asian firms cannot be fully understood
without analyzing the context within which technology is
exploited. Current IOS (Inter-Organizational Systems)
studies emphasize the removal of barriers to
e-marketplace acceptance in relation to technological,
organizational, and inter-organizational factors. However,
the contextual influences of IOS are largely ignored. We
highlight three levels of contextual influences – structural,
national/regional, and socio-cultural – that shape the
adopters’ expectation of e-marketplace applications in
three Asian regions (India, Taiwan, and China). Our study
formulates arguments that attempt to flesh out the
constraint of context as one of the most significant, but
often neglected, dimensions of e-marketplace acceptance.

1. Introduction
There has been a rising interest in using
e-marketplaces (electronic marketplaces) to enable closer
B2B (Business-to-Business) collaboration. Nonetheless,
the widespread e-marketplaces have not been adopted
readily into companies in Asia. The study is an initial
attempt to explore the reasons for the non-acceptance of
e-marketplace in inter-organizational contexts situated in
a different cultural setting.
An e-marketplace can be defined as a platform that
uses the Internet to enable buyers and sellers to conduct
inter-firm trading [3]. There are three generic forms of
e-marketplace [8]: (1) industry-based (i.e. vertical) or
product-oriented (i.e. horizontal) e-marketplaces backed
by founding members, (2) private e-marketplaces, usually
formed by a single buyer or supplier, to link up their
business partners, and (3) public e-marketplaces that are
set up by neutral third party, known as “Net Market
Makers”, to facilitate business transactions for their
participants, with their revenue coming from
subscriptions and transaction-based fees.
Although e-marketplaces can reduce transaction costs,
improve process efficiency, and enable virtual
collaboration among partners, market analysts have
reported that the majority of them have either closed down
or are facing difficulties in attracting buyers and suppliers
[21]. Recent reports, though somewhat limited, have
shown that sole reliance on the application of the US
business models in Asia is a recipe for failure [4][8][19]
[23].
The present study seeks to highlight the limitations of
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a technical-economic view of e-marketplace adoption [2]
[18]. It explains how contextual forces that have shaped
Asian businesses play an important role in the adoption of
e-marketplaces.

2. Barriers to
e-Marketplaces

the

acceptance

of

Three broad categories of adoption barriers have been
identified
in
current
literature:
technological,
organizational, and inter-organizational [11][16][25].
Technological barriers are concern with technological
complexity. For example, the adoption of e-marketplaces
requires effective the use of external network technologies.
As security technology is still at an embryonic stage,
transaction risks are endemic. Other major technological
challenges include system integration, software migration,
data conversion, and the compatibility of hardware and
software between partners [19]. For most adopters of
e-marketplace, the sheer complexity of technological
problems can prevent them from accepting the new
technology.
A common intra-organizational inhibitor is the lack of
sufficient training and education in the technologies
involved. Furthermore, the adoption of e-marketplaces
often requires companies to redesign their internal
business processes, if the technologies are to be used
effectively [5][20]. But this is not easy, especially when
operations are deeply bound by different technologies in
different organizations. Lee and Clark [20], for example,
explore two failed attempts to introduce electronic
exchanges into the potted plants and fresh meat sectors.
They explain that the ineffective integration of product
and transaction flow, which caused inconsistent
purchasing quality, was a major cause of such failure.
Clark and Stoddard [5] also point out that a key adoption
barrier is to exchange marketplace data among
organizations in transaction and replenishment processes.
They explain that new technologies break old routines and
the keepers of the old routines often resist, usually
because they have to master new socio-technical skills
that are imperfectly realized and barely understood in
relation to existing ways of doing things.
Inter-organizational barriers often arise from the
factor of power and trust [1][11]. For example, in a case
study of Ford Motors [27], the company was in a strong
position to instigate the use of electronic procurement
with its suppliers. However, its attempt to exercise
coercive power over suppliers (e.g. through the transfer of

investment costs to them) resulted in adopters’ resistance.
Trust factor is another barrier. There are two aspects of
trust: competence trust, which is concerned with a
partner’s ability to perform according to expectations, and
intentional trust, which refers to a partner’s intention not
to defect from its collaborative party [24]. For instance,
Hart and Saunders [11] analyze a retail company and show
that asymmetry of product information-sharing among
partners may lead to distrust of the market makers’
competence, leading to adopters’ abortion from the
e-marketplace. Allen et al. [1] investigate an unproductive
e-marketplace called TransLease (designed for
automobile insurance) and explain how mutual distrust in
intention arose among buyers (lease firms) and sellers
(repair agents), stemming from both parties’ conflicting
goals. From a cognitive perspective, Barrett [4] explains
why adopters (brokers and underwriters) feared the
uncertainty and job security brought about by the London
Insurance Market, where distrust emerged as a result of
adopters’ negative interpretations of the technology’s
intention.
One important matter overlooked in current
investigations is the role of context, not only as a cause of
inaction but also as a key factor involved in the production
of barriers [2]. In this view, barriers to the adoption of
e-marketplaces may derive from institutional contexts,
including structural, national/regional, and socio-cultural
aspects (categories which are not mutually exclusive).
Structural constraints are key adoption barriers in the
adoption of e-marketplaces, especially in many
developing countries in Asia. For example, the ineffective
infrastructure in telecommunications, financial systems
(e.g. electronic payment systems), legal and regulatory
systems (e.g. taxation), and the logistics systems (e.g.
transportation) will inhibit the adoption of e-marketplaces
[21].
Barriers to e-marketplace applications cannot be fully
appreciated without also understanding the challenges
that stem from national and regional contexts. This point
is underscored by a study that examines the adoption of
e-marketplaces in Cyprus [2]. As the basis for a national
agenda to transform small-sized enterprises into flexible,
specialized organizations, the Cyprus government
initiated a major industry restructuring. Avgerou [2]
examined the introduction of three consortium-based
e-marketplaces in the furniture industry. In spite of the
existence of sufficient technological and financial
supports, the furniture manufacturers aborted the use of
these systems. As such, this failure should be seen in
broader national and regional contexts.
Historically, Cypriot firms had moved from mass
production to mass customization in order to pursue niche
market, using the strategy of flexible specialization.
However, the e-marketplace had been designed for
volume transactions (mass production). Using it in the
context of complex transactions (mass customization) was
inconvenient. Moreover, the entrepreneurs were family
owners, who understood their craft, suppliers and markets
well, but were not at ease with e-marketplace. Hence, it

was not possible for them to incorporate such systems in
their existing operations. The owners neither had the skills
to incorporate the system nor did they have the desire to
make the changes. They would have had to reconfigure
their customary business models and introduce
professional managers into most of the family-owned
businesses. This would mean asking entrepreneurs to
relinquish power and undertake radical organizational
transformation. These developments were all contrary to
the
entrepreneurs’
expectations
in
adopting
e-marketplaces, and the project ultimately failed.
The third impact of socio-cultural constraints on
adoption failures may be illustrated in the case of the
failure of SPRINTEL [18]. SPRINTEL was an
e-marketplace designed for the textile trading community
in Prato (near Florence, Italy). In spite of the provision of
sound technical and economic solutions, Prato’s traders
did not accept the e-marketplace. In contrary, it developed
distrust among traders. The distrust, which became the
basis for resistance to the system, was not rooted in
technical failures of the system but from Prato merchants’
socio-cultural concerns.
Historically, Prato’s traders had established an
industry network formed by business communities that
trusted each other. Their social relations were embedded
within economic activities. Traders saw little value in
having exchange systems that enabled faster and more
reliable transactions. Prato’s traders also preferred
“high-context” communications (e.g. face-to-face
encounters with rich body expression), and were worried
that an e-marketplace might disable these preferred social
interactions. Additionally, we need to appreciate that these
Prato traders did not regard maximization of profit as the
only purpose of business; rather, people participated in
business as one important way of socialization. Moreover,
these Prato traders were concerned that an e-marketplace
might reveal the existence of redundant inventories,
which, in their cultural context, would mean a public
confession of business incompetence. Participation in a
more transparent system would mean that not only other
traders would know one’s affairs; so would the tax
authorities. The traders were worried about the impact of
disclosing
information
about
their
sommerso
(underground economy activities), such as tax evasion, in
a cultural context where tax payment is seen as fair game.
While technology is typically thought of as a thing, as
an entity, it is evident that for the traders of Prato it was a
social relationship. The SPRINTEL study highlights the
fact that technology acceptance is not based merely on
technical excellence and economic gains. People do not
communicate the meaning that they attribute to a
technology individually, but collectively, in a common
sense making. The SPRINTEL case clearly reveals that
distrust resulted from the technology being interpreted
negatively as a result of the socio-cultural context into
which it was introduced.
Research into contextual influences offers a useful
lens when examining technology adoption that involves
cross-cultural transfer. Adopters’ social expectations of

technology use are shaped by the context within which
they normally operate. When researchers investigate the
adoption of e-marketplaces in differing social, cultural,
and geographical contexts, the conception of technology
as a variable whose inherent capabilities premise its
adoption becomes quite limited. The constraining role of
context is significant in understanding the origins of
resistance to technology adoption within organizations.

3. Research Methods
Our research took place in Commerce One (one of the
leading vendors of e-marketplaces). The company had
realized that their Asia headquarters were facing a major
adoption challenge that had not been foreseen in terms of
the marketing strategy adopted from the US headquarters.
The US strategy promoted the benefit of cost reduction
and process efficiency, but it did not seem to work in Asia.
In spite of the company’s marketing efforts, the level of
acceptance remained low. With the help of the company,
our pilot study involved three of their country portals
(disguised name) – IndiaMarket (in India), TaiwanMarket
(in Taiwan), and ChinaMarket (in China). The first author
interviewed more than 50 key participants over a
16-month period (from January 2001 to April 2002). The
data were mainly based on personal interviews with
technology providers and adopters. Extensive field notes
were taken during and immediately after these interviews.
In this paper we report our preliminary findings
concerning the contextual constraints that persist in
e-marketplace adoption in Asia.
The approach to data analysis that we adopted is one
that relies upon the contextualist perspectives [2] and
cross-cultural transfer of technology [18]. An important
analytical aim is to examine how the different contexts of
solution providers and potential adoptee influence the
adopter’s expectation of e-marketplace use.
Three theoretical angles were used to guide our field
interviews and investigate the non-acceptance reasons in
each site. In IndiaMarket, we examined the structural
context and highlighted the impact of India’s complex
taxation systems on e-marketplace adoption. In
TaiwanMarket, we turned to the conditions shaped by the
national and regional contexts. We explored how industry
migration in Taiwan had gradually shifted Taiwanese
adopters’ expectations of e-marketplaces. In ChinaMarket,
we explored the extent to which the theory of Chinese
Relationalism informed a different cultural pattern of
business
practice,
in
contrast
to
Western
(Anglo-American) models of commerce. Understanding
the extent to which such a pattern constitutes a different
frame offers valuable explanation of the underlying
resistance to e-marketplace systems in the Chinese trading
community.
The three stakeholders in the e-marketplace studied
consisted of buyers, sellers, and NMMs (Net Market
Makers, see Figure 1), the latter as information
intermediary. NMMs provide two important services to
participating members. First, they offer a technological

platform for both buyers and sellers to conduct product
search, procurement, auction and transaction. Secondly,
NMMs offer physical value-added services to fulfill
business transactions, including product content
management, business intelligence, financial payment,
logistics, and shipping inspection. To sustain revenue,
NMMs normally charge buyers and sellers a subscription
or transaction fee for their services. Alternatively, other
NMMs assist adopters in installing their own proprietary
e-marketplace systems by charging consulting and
software licensing fees. The common goal of NMMs is to
achieve a critical mass of adopters so that they can collect
enough subscription fees to sustain their services. To
achieve this, a common adoption strategy is to recruit
large buyers and attract the associated sellers. The value
proposition for buyers, offered by these three NMMs, is to
access more sellers (suppliers), gain best price advantage
and streamline supply chain processes.
Licensing/consulting fees
Transaction fees, Subscription fees

buyer

buyer

Net Market Maker

seller

seller

buyer
seller
Technology infrastructure
Offer services in e-marketplace software, data centres and application service providers
Value-added Service Providers
Offer value-added services, including logistics provider, financial transaction services,
content management, business intelligence

Figure 1. The Function of a Net Market Maker
NMMs had a crucial role to play as brokers, in whose
interests the spread of adoption would be hastened. Yet,
upon the completion of our fieldwork, most adopters had
not fully adopted e-marketplace solutions, despite the
actions of both Commerce One and the NMMs as
providers of solutions that involved the adoption of the
e-spaces on sale. The potential adopters were less
concerned with technological problems, process
integration, and inter-organizational trust, as emphasized
in the IOS literature. Although adopters reported common
constraints imposed by the public infrastructure (such as
poor telecommunications and electricity provision), they
seemed to worry more about the crises arising from their
local contexts. We came to recognize the importance of
seeing these adopters’ resistance to e-marketplaces as
something that required careful consideration of the
influence of contextual conditions. A summary of the
three cases is shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Description of Cases
Background

Time of
launch
Technologic
al Platform
Value added
services

Adoption
strategy

Focus of
analysis:
contextual
constraints

IndiaMarket
A project
seeking to
business
opportunities in
light of Indian
government’s
IT Bill.
May 2001

TaiwanMarket
A quasigovernment
project helping
Taiwanese
manufacturers
to integrate
supply chains
with MNC.
March 2001

ChinaMarket
A government
initiative to
prepare for
WTO entry.

May 2000

Commerce One’s e-marketplace systems:
e-procurement, e-auction, and order management.
Change
Data center,
Financial
management,
hosting
transactions,
telecom
services,
technological
infrastructure,
technology
infrastructure,
logistics,
integration,
logistics, and
Credit-rating
financial
Digital
information
transactions,
certification.
services,
business
business
intelligence,
surveillance,
product
pre-shipment
catalogue
inspections, and management.
financial
payment.
Buyer-led
Buyer-led
Buyer-led
adoption,
adoption:
adoption:
government
leverage on a
targeted at 50
initiated: focus
government
major buyers in
on state-owned
initiated project
India.
exporting
for computer
industry; aiming companies in
ten key
to recruit key
industries.
buyers as
shareholders.
Socio-cultural
National/
Structural
context
regional
constraints
(Guanxi
contexts
(especially
networks).
(Industry
taxation issue).
migration).

4. Findings:
Influences

Unearth

the

Contextual

4.1 IndiaMarket case: Taxation Dynamics
Not until the late 1980s, when the government realized
the futility of shutting India off from the rest of the world
and started to liberalize the economy, by opening up the
Indian business community to international competition.
Faced with this challenge, Indian businesses began to
adopt international trade practices. The federal
government also introduced an Information Technology
Bill in June 2000 with the aim of integrating the
fragmented markets that existed among the 30 states
comprising the federation, in order to attract foreign direct
investment.
By late 2000, Indian’s e-commerce appeared to be
promising. Large enterprises, such as TELCO, one of the
flagship TATA companies, began to sell scrap machinery
and manufacturing surplus to partners through
e-marketplaces. Increasingly, MICO (a BOSCH
subsidiary) also sold fuel injection pump inventory to its

partners over the Internet. Nonetheless, most enterprises
still could not afford the cost of either setting up
e-marketplaces.
In May 2001 IndiaMarket was incorporated to provide
intermediary information services to Indian business
communities. It commenced with an early success in the
form of the introduction of an e-procurement solution for
DCM Shriram Consolidated Ltd., an e-auction for
Hindalco (India’s largest aluminum producer), and an
e-marketplace for Tata International. IndiaMarket’s
strategic vision was to help Indian enterprises shift their
trading relationships to e-marketplaces.
In terms of structural constraints, the lack of sound
infrastructure was still the primary barrier to the adoption
of IndiaMarket. These explicit constraints included poor
infrastructure in financial, logistic, legal and other
services in India. In terms of financial infrastructure,
Indian adopters reported that most areas still had no
efficient inter-bank transaction systems. Issuing a letter of
credit could involve as many as seven banks and
government agencies. There were also no monitoring
systems to evaluate suppliers’ credit risks. In terms of
logistics infrastructure, there were still few established
third party logistics providers. It was difficult to keep
track of consignments as well as to maintain reasonable
control of traffic in cities. In terms of legal infrastructure,
the overburdened legal system presented numerous
difficulties when a legal sanction was needed against
defaulting debtors. The lengthy legal processes alerted
buyers to the problems of transacting with suppliers
lacking credentials. Finally, because of poor
telecommunications infrastructure, constant power
breakdowns were a part of life. The demand for electricity
outstripped supply in many industrial cities such as New
Delhi and Bangalore.
These were the explicit structural constraints.
However, there was one implicit structural constrain that
was, perhaps the most serious threat to e-marketplace
adoption: India’s taxation systems. Adopters doubt
whether an e-marketplace can be localized easily to
accommodate the complexity of governmental taxation
variation. One example of this variation is in the way in
which the central and state governments levy taxes. The
federal government is empowered to levy central taxes,
which includes sales, custom and service taxes. The states
levy sales taxes and excise duty based on the value of
commodities. Another impediment is the “octroi”, a tax on
the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or
sale. The federal government also allows the states to levy
taxes on inter-state sales. The effect is the creation, within
each state, of a tariff zone where taxes are levied on
exports to other states. Even with the ceiling on the
inter-state sales tax, the cascading nature of the tax system
produces a situation where effective tax rates are uncertain,
as tax costs vary with the process of the goods sold.
Consider the following example of an automobile
parts manufacturer in New Delhi. Based in state A, when a
sales forecast plan was proposed, the company had to pay
pre-sales taxes to the government of state A. The company

also had to pay turnover taxes on a fiscal year basis. If the
company transported products to state B, it had to pay
excise taxes to the government of that state. Any
components sold there would also be subjected by the
local government of state B to local sales taxes, service
taxes, and turnover taxes. The complexity was
compounded by the constant variation of the tax structure,
in terms of both the rate of tax and the range of taxable
items. With components consisting of several hundred
parts, putting the mathematics of taxation into a computer
program would itself be a very difficult task. Moreover,
one should also appreciate that Indian businessmen are
always worried about exposure of their various
tax-avoidance tactics (this is similar to Prato’s case).
The use of e-marketplaces runs against India traders’
social expectation in response to the business conventions
shaped by those structural conditions. The reasons for
non-acceptance of the technology can thus be understood.

4.2 TaiwanMarket: Industry Migration
Before 1998, a hostile political relationship had
severely handicapped formal business collaboration. The
softening of those relationships encouraged Taiwanese
enterprises to extend their manufacturing bases to the
major cities in China. Adding to this industry migration
was the strategic transfer by multi-national corporations
(MNCs) of their regional headquarters to China. For most
Taiwanese firms, this could involve the migration of their
whole supply chain to China. In the computer industry, for
example, Compaq alone procured about US$85 billions in
Taiwan in 2000. If Taiwanese firms did not move with
their key buyers, they would soon put their
long-established business relationship into jeopardy.
In March 2001, a Taiwanese quasi-government agent,
Institute for Information Industry (III) decided to help the
computer industry build an e-marketplace to link up
buyers (Compaq was the first test site) and suppliers
(Taiwanese firms). The purpose was to maintain close
collaboration with these key buyers while assisting
Taiwanese suppliers to streamline their supply chain
operations.
The transformation from domestic to regional
operation presented a great challenge to Taiwanese firms.
The migration involved not only moving factories and
people to China but also managing product designs,
strategic sourcing, and supply chain activities across the
different regions of China. For example, the relocation of
a computer notebook manufacturer required product
design engineers in Taiwan to work collaboratively with
manufacturing sites in Shanghai and Xiamen. The
company often had to hold co-location meetings in order
to make sure that products were designed to comply with
specification and manufacturability requirements.
Face-to-face discussions and conference calls were
perceived as trustworthy methods of communication.
Moreover, the company had to extend its supplier bases to
China, which meant that it had to replace some of its
Taiwanese tier three suppliers and to source local
suppliers in China for reasons of cost advantage.

The context of industry migration helps us to
understand why these Taiwanese firms were not interested
in e-marketplaces (presented in the US model) that mainly
offered the functions of product search, electronic
procurement, and auction. In the context of industry
migration, Taiwanese firms’ managerial attention was
more concerned with collaborative design, strategic
sourcing, supply chain management, customer retention,
and regional operation. The e-marketplace did not match
this expectation and was considered to be of little use.

4.3 ChinaMarket: Chinese Relationalism
In 2000, China faced the challenge of entering the
WTO (World Trade Organization). The government
sought to transform key national enterprises (such as steel
industry) in order to prepare them for the transition from
the traditional planned economy to a market economy. To
achieve this end, the government agent (The Development
Research Center of The State Council) initially planned to
construct an unprecedented industrial park, big enough to
accommodate ten key business sectors. International
traders could visit this industrial park, search products,
identify potential business partners, and achieve one-stop
shopping.
The establishment of such an industrial park required
enormous investments, in terms of money, land, and other
resources. Additionally, state planners envisaged that
upon completion such an industrial park could result in
major traffic problems, the possibility of an increase in
criminality through concentrating major commerce, as
well as an increased demand for enhanced public services.
Thus, from the state perspective, the risks associated with
such a project were high. Building a vast incubator on
such a scale would also have major socio-spatial
implications for the host region.
Eventually, the planners conceived the concept of a
virtual business park, incorporated as ChinaMarket.com
in March 2000, with the aim of enabling the idea of an
e-WTO response (i.e. using electronic means to respond
to the WTO challenge). An American model of commerce
guided its design.
The launch was not entirely successful. Although
ChinaMarket consultants emphasized the benefits of cost
reduction, process efficiency, and business opportunities
(especially access to more international buyers), adopters
still expressed difficulties in relating the systems to their
existing business practices. To appreciate this dilemma,
we need to understand the socio-cultural context in which
the Chinese conduct their business activity. This involves
Guanxi
(relationship)
networks,
high-context
communication, and in-group favoritism [13][22][15].
In the American model of commerce [18], the purpose
of business emphasizes optimal economic gains
achievable under a model of rational assumptions (this
generalization is only for illustration; in fact, American
businessmen also emphasize relationship-based trade, see
[9]). Cost and efficiency are two important criteria of this
model. For example, buyers are conceived as agents
wishing to invest in technology in order to reduce search

costs (by identifying suppliers more quickly), transaction
costs (by increasing process efficiency), and labor costs.
Buyers will readily replace suppliers should they find
preferable substitutes that can offer better product quality
at a lower price. If there are non-repudiation issues, buyers
and suppliers can settle their disputes through legal
assistance.
Chinese traders operate with a different approach to
business, using a different frame of assumptions (note:
again, the generalization is for explanatory purpose; it will
be problematic when different regions of Chinese traders
are considered). Because contemporary China has not yet
established a sound market and legal infrastructure,
entrepreneurship often follows a culturally conventional
approach of building business from family-based
networks. In this context, since most non-repudiation
issues and other trade disputes cannot be settled easily
within the Chinese legal framework, the selection of
business partners involves high risks, especially where
non-family members are involved. Thus, the tendency is
to keep business, as much as possible, within the family or
close kin relations. Reducing business risks becomes a
prime objective of the formation of any business
partnership. To evaluate the trustworthiness of their
trading partners, the Chinese often employ a set of implicit,
but specific, strategies.
First, Guanxi networks are used widely to extend
personal (family-based) relationships to business
relationships. Chinese businessmen generally consider
three types of network: family, friends and strangers[7]
[15]. These three types of network represent how well a
person can trust their business partners. For example,
Chinese traders often trace the genealogy of their potential
partners to see if there is any family linkage. This does not
mean that they will necessarily trust their partners as long
as a kinship link is found. The purpose will be to use
family relatedness as a way of tracing the partners’
background, in order to learn about their credit, past
record of business practice, and personal integrity.
Forming business partnerships, for most Chinese traders,
is like establishing life-long friendships. For Chinese
traders, Guanxi is not just about forming business
relationships but also about forming personal friendships,
with the purpose of reducing business risks.
Second, having these networks as a method of
checking personal credentials is not enough. Chinese
traders also develop an implicit method for evaluating
personal integrity, reducible to one ultimate question: how
can I trust this person with my business? Chinese traders
employ tacit communication protocols, known as
high-context communication: messages are comparatively
terse in words, but rich in meaning [22].
For Chinese traders, metaphors are frequently used as
a means for high-context communication. This has at least
three purposes: to avoid direct conflicts, to test personal
integrity and intelligence, and to communicate meaning
with maximum ambiguity (so no one has to promise
anything and rush into partnerships). Additionally, in
order to assess trustworthiness it is more important to

observe the other person’s social behavior than to consider
what the person says rhetorically.
Third, building business partnerships in this
Guanxi-based context breeds favoritism. However, one
must not be tempted to attribute negative meanings (such
as bribery) to favoritism; otherwise, one may only see
favoritism in terms of its face value. Favoritism is
considered as an appropriate way to maintain existing
Guanxi networks in Chinese business communities [14].
Understanding the socio-cultural context in Chinese
business communities helps one appreciate its influence
on the rate of acceptance of e-marketplaces. The
introduction of e-marketplaces will inevitably threaten
Chinese traders’ existing ways of building and
maintaining Guanxi networks. Identifying suppliers
through a computer interface presumes that buyers can
reasonably trust suppliers, but this assumption conflicts
with the traditional Chinese Guanxi approach to assessing
potential partners. Although Chinese traders could
identify more promising suppliers by using an
e-marketplace, they would also be hesitant to replace
existing suppliers for fear of jeopardizing long-standing
Guanxi networks.
Chinese adopters thus perceive the e-marketplace as
an unsophisticated way to minimize business risks,
especially without the fluid assistance gained by
mobilizing their Guanxi networks. Additionally, for
Chinese traders used to conducting businesses through
human interactions, i.e. through the social processes
normally used to make friends and gain recognition in
business communities, the depersonalized system features
were perceived as obstacles to a properly social business
relation. For the Chinese, good business practice should
involve assessing trusted persons through existing Guanxi
networks, building business partnerships through personal
relationships, and maintaining Guanxi through in-group
favoritism and reciprocity. According to these
assumptions,
the
e-marketplace
based
on
technical-economic assumption seems to add little value,
and is insensitive, to these Chinese adopters’ social
expectation of technology use.

5. Implications: The Significant Role of Context
A frequent comment suggested by adopters of these
three e-marketplaces is that e-marketplaces seem to be an
American management practice that does not fit easily
with Asian contexts. But, why do they make such
comments? Our study offers a contextualist explanation.
This research highlights three kinds of contextual
influence on e-marketplace acceptance: the structural
contexts, national/regional, and socio-cultural. First, the
study of IndiaMarket supports Markus and Soh’s [21]
observations concerning the effect of structural conditions.
Structural constraints, such as the lack of logistic,
financial, educational, and legal infrastructures, can
significantly influence the decision to accept technology.
Particularly, such structural influences are often difficult
to resolve within a short period of time, as they are deeply

embedded in political and economic systems within a
country.
Second, our findings in the TaiwanMarket case
resemble those in Avgerou’s [2] study of the unsuccessful
adoption of e-marketplace in Cyprus. The changing
national/regional context redefines the role of information
systems in business operations. Non-acceptance occurs
because adopters cannot see the relevance of technology
use in response to the challenge imposed by their specific
national or regional context. For many such local contexts
the customary business practice are of more salience than
the efficient markets assumed elsewhere.
Third, ChinaMarket’s case echoes SPRINTEL’s
failure in Italy [18]. Similar propositions are also
supported by other research: for example, Martinsons and
Westwood’s [22] study of MIS adoption in Chinese
enterprises, and Walsham and Sahay’s [26] investigation
of Geographical Information Systems in India.
Generally, Asian-based studies, such as Kendall et al.’s
[17] survey of e-commerce adoption in Singapore, and
Hempel and Kwong’s [12] investigation of B2B
e-commerce in China, overlook such contextual
influences. Our aim in this study is to urge practitioners
and researchers not to limit their evaluation to the
technical-economic dimension of adoption problems,
thereby failing to appreciate the more subtle aspect of
contextual influence.

6. Conclusion
The three case studies offer an initial explanation of
the adoption challenge of e-marketplace in three
geographical regions in Asia. The analysis focuses on the
embedded context for business activity rather than the
technological features and organizational processes. We
conclude that the resistance to e-marketplace was not
limited
to
technological,
organizational
and
inter-organizational impediments. In the three cases it is
more important to understand the role of context in
shaping adopters’ expectation of technology use [10],
which in turn led to non-acceptance. In this situation,
adopters were unclear how an e-marketplace would add
value to their businesses. Hence, if e-marketplace use is
perceived as irrelevant to the expectation of the adopters –
expectations shaped by contexts – the entire adoption
effort may wither before technology has a chance to take
root. Hence, effective adoption of technology depends on
a consideration of how people’s expectation of technology
use is met in a given context. The lens of context adds a
fruitful, alternative perspective in explaining and
anticipating technology outcomes.
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